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Abstract
This paper examines problems with defining the requirements for a postgraduate course in
Information Security. It examines the concept of information and from that develops the
components needed for a comprehensive and integrated programme. Also, it examines the
confusion associated with the term ‘Information Security’.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
This paper originated from an idea to create a full postgraduate programme in Information
Security. The university concerned already had a Graduate Certificate programme in
Computer Security consisting of four units (Computer, Information, Database, and Computer
Facilities Security) and a research Masters in Computer Security, which had four preliminary
units (Computer, Database, Information, and Database Security). A number of unrelated
elements stimulated the desire to produce a new course. The first was recognition, mostly by
students, that the units tended to overlap in content. This was especially true of Computer
and Information Security. The second factor related to the need for an increase in the
development of information security professionals at all levels and the fact that this cannot
be met using the existing education in most countries (Schou, 2001). The third was the
intake of a number of staff who had research interests in Information Warfare (Denning,
1999; Waltz, 1998; Hutchinson and Warren, 2001a; 2001b).
This latter aspect led to a desire to develop a more inclusive Information Security course
based on the concept of ‘Information Warfare’. This was thought necessary to bring the
education of Information Security out of the reactive and defensive paradigm found in many
security courses. A unit in this subject had already been running in a Doctor of Business
Administration programme. The idea was to expand on this concept and include all the
aspects of information security. However, the initial problem was defining both ‘information’
and ‘information security’. The former was a term used by various people to mean anything
from straight computer security to military attacks on infrastructure. It was a broad
expression that also included in some quarters (Campen and Dearth, 2000) such peopleorient topics such as psychological warfare. In fact, Campen and Dearth would say that
psychological warfare is the main aim of information warfare. It seemed that this broad
expression would form the basis of the course. However, there was some concern over the
name ‘information warfare’ as a full course. This concern was caused by a perception that
the term was short-term fad, and also that others had (especially the military) used the term
‘information operations’ (a slightly different concept) for much the same subject material.
The term ‘information security’ cropped up again. It was amore conventional term and
seemed to have a relatively distinct meaning. However, after searching texts and Information
Security sites such as that of the Information Security Magazine (2002), it became clear that
there was a massive overlap with conventional Computer Security. If fact, there was little to
distinguish between them. The Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD, 2002) defines
it thus:
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Information security (Infosec) is usually defined as the combination of
communications security (Comsec) and computer security (Compusec). The
definition may also include radiation security (Radsec), which refers to
emissions from devices such as monitors and printers (also known as
TEMPEST). In short, the term Infosec relates to the security of any
information that is stored, processed or transmitted in electronic or similar
form.
This is a totally technology and data based view. Only one text found (Pipkin, 2000) seemed
to stray from this conventional viewpoint and actually attempt to talk about information rather
than technology and data.
Therefore, a decision was made to go ‘back to basics’, and examine the word ‘information’.
The conventional definition of a data-information-knowledge-wisdom continuum did not
prove very useful. Previous experience trying to define ‘Knowledge Management’ made the
team realise that this model was likely to create superficial and ambiguous ideas. Another
model was sought. The most promising model and the one eventually used and modified
information was that created by Boisot (1998). His definition of ‘information’, ‘data’, and
‘knowledge’ seemed the most appropriate to use and expand for this exercise.

DEFINING ‘INFORMATION’
In Boisot’s model, data is associated with a thing, and discriminates between different
states of the thing it describes. It consists of attributes of the events or objects it describes.
On the other hand, knowledge is an attribute of an agent. Knowledge is a set of interacting
mindsets about data activated by an event. Hence, in most circumstances the word ‘agent’
means a human being or a group of people. Information is the set of data filtered by the
agent within the bounds of the knowledge held by the agent. It establishes a link between
the agent and the data. Figure 1 illustrates the concept. This figure shows that information is
produced by a human/group receiving data, and using a subset of that data dependent on
the context in which it is received and the individual’s/group’s mindset/worldview.
Using this model developed above, the basic concepts of information security can be shown.
Figure 1 also illustrates the main attack strategies pertinent to each of the elements in
information production. It shows the nexus between Boisot’s model and information
security/warfare.
The vulnerability of each component can thus be seen to be:
Data
If the target of an attack is the data, a number of things can be done:
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•

Deny access to data: this can be achieved by attacks on hardware or systems
containing the data or its collection, or deletion of data. As much data has a
temporal dimension, it could also involve the delaying of access to data to the
point at which it becomes useless. These attacks can range from denial of
service to the deliberate withholding of data.

•

Disrupt or Destroy data: this is similar to the above, but disruption can be
caused to the system collecting and storing the data, or to that part of the
system, which disseminates it. Destruction of the data can occur by physical
destruction of the storage medium, or the data itself, so it becomes irrecoverable
in the time needed to make it useful. Of course, it can be argued that data is
never destroyed, just the medium on which it is stored.

•

Manipulation of data: data can by added, deleted, or amended to give the
attacker advantage. A person committing fraud would often use this method.

•

Steal data: much corporate data is confidential and can also give competitive
advantage. Theft of this data (and remember, theft of data can go unnoticed as
the victim could still have it) might give insights into the workings of the attacked
thereby giving the attacker a possible business, negotiation, or criminal
advantage. Thus, the consequences are different from the other three attack
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methods in that ‘good’ information is unwillingly shared with unauthorised people
or systems.
Disrupt technology for
data input, storage,
processing and output
Data

Deny, Destroy, Disrupt,
Manipulate, Steal.

Context

Knowledge
Alter
environmental,
and/or haptic signals, etc.

Alter mental models, eg
education, propaganda,
group pressure

Deny
actioning,
communication to
others.
INFORMATION

Attempt to alter
context, data set.

Figure 1: The relationships between data, context, knowledge, information; and the methods
by which each element can be attacked (adapted from Hutchinson and Warren, 2001b)
Context
The objective in altering the context of a situation is that the target will misinterpret the data
being presented. This can be achieved by affecting environmental or sensory signals
received by the target in any particular situation. It is similar to an attack on data but is more
ephemeral. In attacking context, you are trying to alter the situation in which the data is
viewed. This can include such things as place, sensory surroundings, mood, and political
climate. It is really concerned with manipulating the way the data are to be interpreted.
Knowledge
The strategies to deal with knowledge tend to be more long term. As mental models are
developed by a person’s experiences, they are created by education, social interaction,
emotions, and so on. Changing perceptions is directed more toward the people themselves,
and their thought processes. This can include public relations, advertising, and incentives.
The assumption is that the attacker will exploit any situation created by the attack. This
emphasises the need to defend human as well as technological assets as a part of an
information security plan, something often ignored.
Information
Although information is now ‘created’, its dissemination can now be corrupted, stopped, or
slowed.
It became increasingly obvious that a comprehensive course in Information Security would
involve more than traditional computer security. Such a course would need elements that
included:
•

Defensive measures for data production/access/alteration/storage/destruction,
data communication, knowledge management, data interpretation, information
use and communication, and
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•

Offensive measures to utilise data/knowledge/information for organisational
benefit.
It became increasingly obvious that a comprehensive course in ‘Information Security’ would
involve more than a traditional computer security.

DESIGNING THE COURSE
The breadth of course and the need for inputs from various disciplines become apparent;
see Figure 2.
‘HARD’ TECHNOLOGY
BASED TACTICS
Physical
destruction

Viruses,
Trojan horses,
etc.

Physical security,
locks, barriers to
entry, etc.

Offensive Information Warfare
Hacking,
Cracking

Firewalls, Intrusion
detection,
Cryptography

Compromising
staff/
communications

Staff
vetting,
document
classification

‘SOFT’ (PEOPLE)
TACTICS

Surveillance
,
Intelligence

Security policy,
education
programmes

Psychological
operations,
Propaganda

Environmental
scanning,
Perception
Management

Defensive Information Warfare
Figure 2: Examples of the range of topics needed in a comprehensive Information
Security/Warfare course
It has to be admitted that as an advanced post graduate course, more attention was put into
the course content and desired outcomes than the means of teaching this material. It was
thought correctly or incorrectly that as a postgraduate course, it should be knowledge
focused rather than concentrating on the educational techniques needed.
The discipline area was separated into ‘soft’ (people oriented) and ‘hard’ (technology
oriented) components as implied by the Boisot model. The more generic skills required from
all students were then determined to enable these to be integrated into the units. These
included skills based on logic, analysis, induction, deduction, observation, cultural and
personality appreciation, and lateral thinking. Much of this is achieved by such exercises as
scenario, role-playing, and analytical problem solving. It was felt that these skills were an
essential part as defensive and offensive require two separate, complementary mindsets; in
fact, two modes of thought. One protective, suspicious, conservative, and cautious; the other
inventive, risk taking, aggressive. Both views are needed to exploit and protect the
information assets within an organisation.
The subject content was then analysed. It needed to include the full breath for all students
with the option for students to specialise in the ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ areas, or in fact, to generalise
in both. Referring to the modified Boisot model in Figure 1, it needed to cover the elements
of data, knowledge, context, and information protection and exploitation. As the investigation
went on, some of the content included much of what is included in a conventional course in
Intelligence (see LEIU, 2000 for a basic summary of an intelligence course). In fact, the
nature of Information Security was changing to include both defensive and proactive
(aggressive) elements resembling security (relatively passive protection), intelligence (active
use of information), and counter-intelligence (aggressive protection of information and its
resources). In fact, we were drifting very much into the Information Warfare/Intelligence
paradigm. Recognising this, the course was renamed to Information Security and
Intelligence.
Details of content needed to cover the full breadth of the area was established and spilt into
domain areas. The core units were designed to cover the core body of knowledge. It should
be noted that, in this context, a unit is a component (sub course) of a complete course. The
final course is now being offered and is split into three stages:
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Stage 1: Graduate Certificate
This consists of four units: 2 compulsory core units and two electives. This stage was
designed to cover the full gambit of factors the Boisot model (the two compulsory units, plus
two specialist units covering an element of the model. These are basically split into
technological ‘hard’ units such as ‘Network Security’, ‘Computer Security’, or ‘soft’ human
oriented units such as ‘Media and Nation’, or ‘Global Communications’. The two compulsory
units are:
•

Information Security: a general introductory unit on Information Security
principles, concentrating on protective measures. It covers all the elements in the
Boisot model and both hard and soft areas from the defensive side.

•

Information warfare: a general introduction to the more aggressive aspects of
Information Security, including Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare but
primarily the offensive. As above, it is a general unit that covers both hard and
soft factors.

Stage 2: Graduate Diploma
This consists of three core and compulsory units. These cover advanced topics in the
defensive mode (Information Security), advanced soft topics concerned with the
mind/information interface (Perception Management), and the exploitation of information
within an organisation (Contemporary Intelligence). The units are:
•

Perception Management: a ‘soft’ unit, which covers psychological warfare. It is
this unit that examines the aggressive use of information. Very much about the
data/ knowledge/ context interface.

•

Contemporary Intelligence: a ‘soft/hard’ unit, which examines contemporary
intelligence and counter-intelligence practice. This is about the proactive use and
defence of information. It involves all elements of the Boisot model but has
emphasis in the Information realm.

Information Security: a ‘technology/ soft’ base unit, which follows on from the
earlier unit. It tends to stay inside the defensive mode but does show the
interface between that and the offensive mode.
This stage provides the core of the course, whilst the former units are introductory in nature.
•

Stage 3: Masters
This stage consists of three units. There are two options:
•

Research/ Project: a research project based either from the student’s
employment, or a theoretical based minor thesis, or

Three advanced units: these can be chosen from a narrow selection of units
from computer/ network/physical security, ethics, cybercrime, or media based
units
This final stage allows the student to specialise by taking advanced units, or to examine their
own organisation using the skills developed in the earlier parts of the course, or to research
a topic of interest in the field.
•

The course still covers traditional fundamental security principles (such as confidentiality,
integrity, and availability) and in the technical computer security based units deals with those
basic topics defined by White el al. (1999) as:
•

Risk analysis

•

Authentication

•

Access controls

•

Basic principles of cryptography

•

Knowledge of the types of malicious software that exist;

•

Basic network security (including a discussion of web security).
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Within the non-traditional security units (for example Information Warfare), a more innovative
way has to be used to teach the subject. The School has been involved with the Australian
Department of Defence in running Information Warfare exercises involving Australia,
Canada, NATO, New Zealand, United Kingdom and USA using collaborative learning (war
gaming) environments (Davey, 2001). This has led to an understanding that newer more
innovative teaching methods may have to be applied to teach certain key concepts.
In this course the progression of units is thought to accomplish the difficult task of covering
the body of knowledge required in this ill-defined field, moving away from the traditional
defensive security norm.

THE STATE OF SECURITY EDUCATION AND R&D WITHIN AUSTRALIA
The course described also has a larger impact; it helps Australia and its future development.
The Australian Federal Government department NOIE (National Office of the Information
Economy) had been looking at the IT security situation within Australia. The aim of the
project was to determine what the situation was within Australia in regards to IT Security
education. The project found that the main requirements were (Aeuckens, 2001):
1. Demand for people with security skills is expected to be strong over the few
years.
2. Recruitment of personnel with security skills is difficult compared to other IT&T
skills.
The project also identified some key issues that related to Australian organisations and the
impact of security, these key issues were (Aeuckens, 2001):
•

Demand is rising - As security becomes an integral business issue, demand for
skilled personnel is growing within Australia;

•

Recruitment of people with the right skill sets is difficult - The greatest difficulty
is in recruiting people with well-rounded security and risk management skills
(likely to include technical and business skills);

•

Security is not just an issue for security personnel - All IT personnel should have
an awareness of security issues and their place in a business environment;

•

Limited Graduate programs - Many organisations recruited new IT graduates.
Graduates did not generally have any specific understanding of security,
therefore it was necessary for them to undergo further training;

•

Education and training opportunities in e-security are not widely available - The
minimum qualification demanded by employers is generally at the Bachelor level
but tends to lack security expertise.
A further NOIE investigation was into security research and development within Australia.
The NOIE research project found it was essential to ensure the long-term health of
Australia’s E-security research for a number of reasons. (King, 2001):
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•

Dependence on foreign e-security providers limits the input that Australia has into
the type and character of products and services developed. Australia should not
be reliant upon other countries dictating appropriate levels of security;

•

A commercial imperative also exists. A secure and trusted electronic
environment is a necessary condition enabling electronic commerce;

•

The e-Security industry is experiencing substantial growth. R&D is an important
link in the innovation chain driving developments in this industry sector. The
Government has an important role to play ensuring that Australia is a global
supplier as well as a consumer of e-security products and services. Eventually,
some kind of security technology, be it hardware or software, will be resident in
every networked device. Maintaining a critical mass of e-security R&D in
Australia is essential to achieving this aim;

•

A robust e-security R&D environment can also play a key role in attracting skilled
e-security workers to Australia, and keep home grown talent from moving
overseas;

Developing A Postgraduate Course in Information Security

•

E-Security R&D will assist in providing the Government with the tools to perform
its role in law enforcement activities to protect information infrastructure and the
public.
The course described within the paper as well as the joint research undertaken by the
authors symbolises the steps that have to be taken to resolve the problems defined by the
Australian Federal Government. Australia faces a common problem with many countries
within the developed world. It is that there is limited teaching of security skills within
Australian Universities and a flawed approach to security R&D within Australia. These two
facets have to be considered as a whole, as this defines the IT Security culture of Australia
within the new millennium, but raising awareness across the economy of the importance of
e-security is seen as a major priority (NOIE, 2001).

CONCLUSION
The exercise of developing this course better focused the participants’ thoughts on an area
in which they were ‘experts’. Hopefully, the end product is a comprehensive addition to the
education world, and will add to intellectual progress in this area. It does expose the narrow,
technological bias of many security courses. Perhaps, this view reflects the general
impression in the IT industry that data and technology are synonymous with information. The
development of this course shows that information security is, in fact, a much richer area of
study and research.
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